U.S. policymakers and experts are focused on two central questions about long-term strategic competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC): How do we assess how well the United States is doing relative to China, and which country has more influence in the Indo-Pacific region?
RAND Project AIR FORCE researchers addressed these questions by first defining what influence means in the context of great-power competition and creating a framework to measure U.S. versus PRC influence. The result brings into focus a well-defined picture of the United States and China’s strengths and weaknesses in third countries in the Indo-Pacific. Overall, neither the United States nor China is clearly “winning” the competition for influence in the Indo-Pacific region as whole, and they have varying levels of influence across countries. U.S. influence is greater in Australia, India, Japan, the Philippines, and Singapore than in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam.
REGIONAL RESPONSES TO U.S.-CHINA COMPETITION IN THE INDO-PACIFIC: STUDY OVERVIEW
In long-term strategic competition with China, how effectively the United States works with allies and partners will be critical to determining U.S. success. To enable closer cooperation, the United States will need to understand how allies and partners view the United States and China and how they are responding to U.S.-China competition.
In this report, which is the main report of a series on U.S.-China competition in the Indo-Pacific, the authors define what U.S.-China competition for influence involves and comparatively assess U.S.-China competition for influence in six countries in Southeast Asia—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam—as well as the roles of three U.S. allies and partners that are active in Southeast Asia—Australia, India, and Japan. The authors first explore why the United States is competing with China in the Indo-Pacific and what the two are competing for. They then develop a framework that uses 14 variables to assess relative U.S.-Chinese influence across countries in the Indo-Pacific. Drawing from interviews in all nine countries and data gathered, the authors apply this framework to assess how regional countries view U.S.-China competition in their respective countries and how China views competition in each of the regional countries. Finally, the authors discuss how the United States could work more effectively with allies and partners in Southeast Asia and beyond.
Key Findings
The United States and China have different strengths and approaches to competition
* Regional countries view the United States as having more diplomatic and military influence than China, and China as having more economic influence.
* Southeast Asian countries rank economic development over security concerns and are generally more worried about Chinese economic influence than Chinese military threats.
* China can leverage its economic influence for a variety of goals, including to weaken U.S. military influence. In contrast, there is no evidence that Association of Southeast Asian Nations countries believe that U.S. military influence serves as a counterweight against Chinese economic influence.
* Regional countries have more shared interests with the United States, but Beijing has more tools it is willing to use against Southeast Asia, including more incentives (“carrots”) and coercive capacity (“sticks”).
* Regional countries prefer to not choose between the United States or China and may not side with the United States if forced to pick. Partner alignment is likely to be weak and incomplete.
The United States could work more effectively with allies and partners
* While direct, bilateral cooperation should remain the primary effort, the United States should do more to coordinate with Australia, India, and Japan in Southeast Asia.
* Coordinating with allies and partners to engage third countries provides four main benefits to the United States: Coordination (1) pools resources, (2) facilitates division of labor that leverages unique allied and partner strengths and relationships, (3) counters PRC influence in countries with which the United States cannot fully engage, and (4) achieves U.S. objectives without asking regional countries to explicitly align themselves with the United States (which regional countries are wary of doing).
* There are five main challenges to effective coordination: (1) government biases and processes favor bilateral efforts instead of cooperation in engaging third countries; (2) the dominant narrative portrays U.S.-China competition in bilateral terms and does not take into account allied and partner contributions; (3) regional countries seek unique and separate relationships with the United States, and there are divergences in interests between the United States, allies, and partners; (4) Chinese influence in allies and partners could undermine their ability and willingness to coordinate with the United States; and (5) differing U.S., allied, and partner planning and budget cycles complicate efforts to develop coordinated or joint plans.
RECOMMENDATIONS
* Develop a list of U.S. objectives and priority countries for competition with China for each region (including the Indo-Pacific) to enable whole-of-government competition.
* Develop targeted nonmilitary means to counter Chinese economic influence in the Indo-Pacific.
* Improve public messaging on the economic benefits and value that U.S. military and security cooperation bring to regional countries.
* Improve U.S. public messaging on U.S.-China competition by increasing messaging on allied and partner contributions and combined efforts.
* Increase defense activities with Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, four countries in which Chinese influence is growing.
* Establish a minimum requirement within the Department of Defense to consult and share U.S. engagement objectives, plans, and activities in the Indo-Pacific with Australia, India, and Japan.
* Expand institution capacity building efforts to deepen shared security interests.
* Avoid framing activities with regional countries mainly in U.S.-China competition terms; consider creative ways to design engagements to achieve similar objectives while avoiding the optics of requiring the partner to choose between the United States or China.
* Initiate a pilot project to develop common five-year security cooperation plans between the U.S. Air Force and the Royal Australian Air Force for Indonesia or Malaysia and between the U.S. Air Force and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force for the Philippines or Vietnam.
* Encourage Indonesia to increase its military activities in the South China Sea and areas such as the Natunas by conducting operations and participating in multilateral air and maritime activities.
* Propose new avenues of U.S. Air Force engagement with Malaysia through its membership in the Five Power Defense Arrangements.
* In Thailand, strive to maintain preferential access and use of U-Tapao—one of the largest airfields in Southeast Asia.
* Leverage senior U.S. engagements with the Vietnamese Ministry of National Defense to emphasize the importance of routinizing service-to-service cooperation.
* For Australia, develop options to expand the Enhanced Air Cooperation component of the Force Posture Initiatives and consider conducting rotational deployments of U.S. Air Force bombers to northern Australia.
Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific: India
In long-term strategic competition with China, how effectively the United States works with allies and partners will be critical to determining U.S. success. This report examines the potential benefits of, and potential impediments to, partnering more closely with India. India is already a peer or near-peer competitor of China across a range of military capabilities, and India’s self-defined core national security interests are in relatively close harmony with those of the United States. However, U.S. planners must be keenly aware of the constraints on both India’s willingness and capacity to forge a partnership based on strategic competition with China. These include persistent aversion to any partnership that might be characterized as “alignment,” even after a major 2020 border clash with China; significant distrust of U.S. commitment and intentions; a highly risk-averse structure for the making and implementing of security policy, particularly vis-à-vis China; economic linkages with China; underfunding of basic military needs; and a lack of military capability and interoperability sufficient for frictionless interaction with U.S. forces. India will likely remain a key U.S. partner, but such challenges should moderate expectations about the pace for increased engagement.
KEY FINDINGS
Several key factors will temper the pace and extent of partnership between the United States and India
* The concept of “non-alignment” did not die with the Cold War. It is more commonly described now in such terms as “strategic autonomy,” but, even after a major 2020 border clash with China, India remains fiercely opposed to any partnership in which it would be seen as the junior partner.
* India regards China as its most significant long-term competitor, and Indian leaders are particularly concerned about the strategic partnership of China with India’s near-term rival Pakistan. But this does not mean that New Delhi has much appetite for confrontation with Beijing — particularly outside the Indian Ocean Region.
* Relations between India and the United States have been consistently warming over the past two decades, but a deep pool of distrust remains. The United States will have to work patiently to overcome this distrust.
* Many items in the U.S. playbook of security engagement will run into institutional barriers in India. These include low levels of military funding, a security policymaking bureaucracy that is not designed for speedy decisions, and a tendency to make security policy on an ad hoc rather than a doctrinal basis.
RECOMMENDATIONS
* Increase emphasis on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions; this represents perhaps the lowest-cost/highest-yield avenue for engagement.
* Enhance U.S.-India cooperation in the areas of cyber and electronic warfare; this represents a threat for which India — despite its somewhat deceptive reputation as an information technology powerhouse — is not well prepared.
* Encourage India’s growing cooperation and engagement with U.S. allies, such as Australia and Japan, and emerging partners, such as Indonesia and Singapore.
* Increase military education programs.
* Encourage India to increase its presence in the Indo-Pacific region, including participation in multilateral air and maritime activities and conducting operations in the South China Sea — while being aware that such participation may be modest.
* Share satellite and other information with India about China’s problematic behavior in disputed Himalayan areas, such as the Galwan Valley and the Doklam Plateau, and elsewhere as needed.
* Accept India’s deep-seated desire for “strategic autonomy.” Any efforts to make India move more quickly than it wishes will be likely to backfire.
* Consult with India before making decisions affecting its interests.
* Increase engagement on maritime domain awareness.
* Seek opportunities to work with India to prevent Chinese political interference and influence operations, including in the cyber arena.
Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific: Indonesia
The U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) 2018 National Defense Strategy highlights the importance of working with regional allies and partners in order to manage China’s rise as a strategic competitor to the United States in the Indo-Pacific region. In this country-level report in a series, the author examines the potential for, and potential impediments to, partnering more closely with Indonesia.
In many ways, Indonesia is a natural partner: Its self-defined core national security interests, including the preservation of its sovereignty against encroachment by any would-be hegemonic regional power, are in relatively close harmony with those of the United States. But U.S. planners must be keenly aware of the constraints on Indonesia’s willingness and capacity to forge a partnership based on strategic competition with China. These constraints include persistent aversion to any partnership that might be characterized as “alignment”; enduring antiforeign attitudes, particularly in military circles; strong desire to balance security engagement among the widest possible array of nations; deep and growing economic linkages with China; an institutional mindset for the military that is geared more toward internal stability than external defense; historical and ongoing underfunding of basic military needs; and a lack of military capability and interoperability sufficient for frictionless interaction with U.S. forces. Although Indonesia will remain an important U.S. partner, such challenges should moderate expectations about the pace for increased engagement.
KEY FINDINGS
* The United States and Indonesia share deep concern about China’s ambitions for regional dominance and willingness to violate international norms in pursuit of these ambitions
* Both states, however, would prefer a strategy that corrals China into compliance with global norms over one based on military confrontation.
* Indonesia remains fiercely opposed to what its strategists term blocs
* It is highly suspicious of the intentions of any foreign powers.
* Indonesia regards China as its only realistic near-term military foe, with a specific potential for military confrontation over its Natuna Islands near the South China Sea
* But because of the imbalance of military capabilities, as well as China’s enormous economic leverage, Indonesia has very little appetite for military confrontation.
* Many items in the U.S. playbook of security engagement will run into institutional barriers in Indonesia
* These barriers include low levels of military funding, a security policymaking bureaucracy that is not designed for speedy decisions, and a tendency to make security policy on an ad hoc rather than a doctrinal basis.
RECOMMENDATIONS
* The U.S. government should accept Indonesia’s deep-seated desire for nonalignment. In practice, this means that the United States should refrain from actions that Indonesia is likely to interpret as forcing it into a de facto alliance: for example, pushing for high-profile advertising of security cooperation with the United States, when Indonesia might prefer greater rhetorical balance.
* The U.S. government should pay particular attention to consultation and protocol. In any meeting with U.S. counterparts, the “deliverables” for Indonesian interlocutors might include courtesy calls, official parades or displays, and any other displays of courtesy.
*The U.S. government should reexamine the legal issues surrounding crew lists. The United States, unlike most other nations, refuses to provide crew lists for U.S. Navy vessels in Indonesian ports.
* DoD and the U.S. Air Force (USAF) should increase emphasis on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), which Indonesian National Military doctrine describes as a core mission. HA/DR improves interoperability, does not impinge on Indonesia’s nonaligned status, and lends itself to multilateral exercises.
* DoD and the USAF should enhance U.S.-Indonesia cooperation in the areas of cyber and electronic warfare. The Indonesian Army is now significantly ahead of its air force counterpart in the cyber arena, and this might be a useful area for USAF engagement.
* DoD and the USAF should encourage Indonesia to increase its presence in the Indo-Pacific region, including participation in multilateral air and maritime activities and conducting operations in the South China Sea—while being aware that such participation might be modest.
Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific: Japan
The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy summary describe a world characterized by a return to great-power competition, most notably with China in the Indo-Pacific region. America’s enduring alliance with Japan not only is the cornerstone of U.S. force posture in the Indo-Pacific region, but also magnifies and bolsters U.S. influence across that vast swath of territory. Within the region, Southeast Asian countries have been particularly exposed to China’s expanding influence and coercive diplomacy in recent years, making the ten countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) a key focus for U.S. national strategy and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) in particular.
The author leverages a framework that RAND developed for a seven-part series on regional responses to U.S.-China competition, with this report focusing on Japan’s perspective. This report assesses the prospects for deepening U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation and coordination in Southeast Asia through 2030 to compete with China. It surveys official Japanese documents, draws on a wide variety of secondary source analyses, and reports the results of more than 25 face-to-face interviews with Japanese defense and foreign policy officials, military officers, think-tank analysts, and academic specialists.
KEY FINDINGS
The outlook for regional position and partnerships appears to be very strong
* Over the next five to ten years, the importance of the U.S. alliance to Japan is virtually impossible to overstate. Japan’s defense engagement with China, by contrast, is virtually nonexistent and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future.
* With respect to Southeast Asia, Japan enjoys a largely positive overall image, and there is a high degree of acceptance of the proposition that Japan should do more to engage with ASEAN nations, especially in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
* U.S. and Japanese efforts to bolster the autonomy of ASEAN states, both individually and as a bloc, by providing them with diplomatic, legal, and other forms of support; assisting them in developing the capacity to monitor and police their waters and airspace; and working to bolster their resilience to and recovery from natural disasters (among other efforts) will help focus on the values and interests that the United States, Japan, and ASEAN have in common.
*Signposts that might indicate that the region is developing in a direction that is welcoming of more U.S.-Japan security and defense cooperation could include increases in tensions between China and key regional players, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam, over competing territorial and/or maritime claims.
RECOMMENDATIONS
* The U.S. government should consider strengthening defense and security cooperation with Japan in Southeast Asia by understanding that leveraging the U.S.-Japan alliance to compete with China in Southeast Asia requires “winning the peace,” not trying to sell Southeast Asian nations on the need to gear up to fight a war with China, and by jointly articulating a policy framework built around ASEAN centrality and the values of autonomy, capacity, and resiliency that Southeast Asians will find attractive.
* DoD and the U.S. Air Force should consider framing U.S.-Japan security cooperation in Southeast Asia around assistance designed to deal with humanitarian disasters, transnational nonstate threats, and air and maritime sovereignty. Where possible, consider engaging with Japan in planning and exercising humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations focused on responding to a crisis in Southeast Asia.
* DoD and the U.S. Air Force should consider expanding professional military education opportunities for Southeast Asian nations in the United States and Japan and exploring opportunities to work with Japan to shape regional militaries through assistance programs focused on building partner capacity.
* DoD and the U.S. Air Force should consider using information-sharing along with exchanges focused on the international laws and regulations governing air and maritime spaces to publicly highlight China’s problematic behavior in the South China Sea and elsewhere, as well as the rights ASEAN states enjoy and their policy options.
Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific: Singapore
This report on Singapore is part of a project examining the perspectives of U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific as they formulate and implement their responses to China’s more assertive foreign and security policy behavior in the region and to a more competitive U.S.-China relationship. Singapore views its relations and partnership with the United States as essential to its security policy. It sees the U.S. regional presence as playing an indispensable role in ensuring its ability to navigate a regional security environment that is increasingly complicated by China’s growing influence and more-assertive Chinese behavior. At the same time, China is Singapore’s most important trading partner, and Singapore aims to maintain a stable relationship with China even as it resists Chinese influence and interference.
The U.S.-Singapore relationship is a success story: Singapore has been and remains a strategic partner for U.S. diplomacy and security efforts in Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific region more broadly. To sustain this success in ways that will buttress U.S. competitive advantage will require a steady hand at the helm of the relationship, strengthening ties across economic and security domains while recognizing the importance to Singapore of stable relations with and growing economic ties to China. Singapore’s geographic location astride the Straits of Malacca, its outsize influence in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the military support afforded the United States by infrastructure and access in Singapore make investments in U.S. attention and treasure both necessary and worthwhile.
KEY FINDINGS
Singapore has deep regional engagement focused on its role as a small but influential economic and political player in ASEAN. Although Singapore promotes “ASEAN centrality” in regional economic, diplomatic, and security policy issues, it also has expanded engagement on multiple fronts with actors outside ASEAN’s membership.
Over the past decade, there have been significant changes to the regional security architecture of the Indo-Pacific. An evolving web of relationships is taking shape, moving the region beyond the traditional “hub-and-spoke” system of bilateral security alliances with the United States.
Singapore is involved as a key security partner for the United States but also as an independent actor seeking a wide variety of security ties and relationships. It has significant partnerships with Australia and India and increasing security ties with China and Japan.
Singapore’s engagement in the region creates opportunities and challenges for the United States. Opportunities continue to outweigh the challenges, specifically for the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Air Force to work with Singapore and with regional partners in new and innovative ways, both operationally and using soft-power tools and approaches.
RECOMMENDATIONS
*Pacific Air Forces and the U.S. Air Force should incrementally increase the current trajectory of both security assistance and operational interface (training, exercises, arms sales).
*Pacific Air Forces and the U.S. Air Force should work with Singapore on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and other traditional and nontraditional security activities.
*The Joint Force should further enhance U.S.-Singapore cooperation in the areas of space, advanced cyber, electronic warfare, and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
*The Joint Force should strengthen U.S.-Singapore cooperation on research and development of advanced capabilities, such as artificial intelligence.
*The U.S. government should continue to encourage Singapore’s growing cooperation and engagement with other U.S. allies, such as Australia and Japan, and emerging partners, such as India and Indonesia.
* The U.S. government should deliberately seek opportunities to work with Singapore to counter Chinese political interference and influence operations.
*The U.S. government should work with Singapore to publicly highlight China’s problematic behavior in the South China Sea and elsewhere.
Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific: Vietnam
Vietnam is arguably one of the most important partners for the United States in the Indo-Pacific region. Vietnam embodies the “free and open” values of the White House’s Indo-Pacific Strategy because Hanoi seeks to preserve its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence in the face of China’s increasingly intrusive economic and military power. Vietnam is deeply concerned about the long-term geostrategic implications of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and is standing up to Beijing’s territorial claims and the growing assertiveness of the People’s Liberation Army in the South China Sea.
The author leverages a framework that RAND developed for a seven-part series on regional responses to U.S.-China competition, with this report focusing on Vietnam’s perspective. Both Beijing and Washington have pressure points on Hanoi — diplomatic and political, economic, and security and military. The report evaluates how Hanoi is responding to these influence variables, especially as U.S.-China competition grows fiercer across the Indo-Pacific and globally. Understanding this requires analyzing Vietnam’s security policy and domestic politics and political, economic, and security ties to the United States and China. Finally, the author discusses the prospects of achieving enhanced U.S.-Vietnam relations to counter rising Chinese coercion in the future, with an eye toward the specific needs of the U.S. Air Force. The research draws on a range of primary and secondary sources in both English and Vietnamese, data sets, and interviews conducted in English that occurred primarily in April 2019.
KEY FINDINGS
China maintains a healthy edge over the United States in influence in Vietnam
* Although Washington is slightly ahead in the diplomatic and political sphere, and it clearly leads in the security and military domain, Beijing is dominant economically.
* Overall, China is an unavoidable partner for Vietnam, as it maintains the preponderance of influence in the country. Consequently, Vietnam’s top priority will be to maintain positive ties with China.
* Acute bilateral challenges with China, nevertheless, seem to have already convinced Vietnamese leadership to upgrade the U.S.-Vietnam partnership. This trend is almost certain to continue as China pushes its expansive and overlapping sovereignty claims with Vietnam in the South China Sea (SCS). Indeed, overall U.S.-Vietnamese ties could dramatically ramp up, specifically in the security domain, if tensions reach a breaking point or armed conflict begins.
* But, realistically, barring a major turn of events in the SCS, it is difficult to see how Vietnam might begin favoring the United States over China.
RECOMMENDATIONS
* The United States should consider deepening and reutilizing interactions with Vietnamese counterparts, prioritizing quality over quantity to avoid any bandwidth challenges.
* The United States should show a commitment to competing with the Belt and Road Initiative to help Vietnam avoid encirclement by pro-China countries.
* Washington should consider allowing its relationship with Hanoi to unfold organically — i.e., allow Vietnamese leaders to arrive at their own conclusions about Chinese behavior and the benefits of working with the United States. Stating or otherwise implying that Hanoi must make a choice as U.S.-China competition heats up is only likely to be counterproductive.
* The joint force should continue to work with and through its allies and partners to find areas of complementarily in key objectives to avoid a duplication of effort in Vietnam.
* In senior-level visits with the Vietnamese Ministry of National Defense, the U.S. Air Force should press for service-to-service cooperation to become routine to minimize the chance of future disruptions.
* The U.S. Air Force should look for opportunities to build the Vietnam Air Defense–Air Force’s (VAD-AF) institutional capacity, particularly its support functions, which are more likely to produce durable gains.
* Because of VAD-AF sensitivities while on base, perhaps the U.S. Air Force could suggest that cooperative activities take place in other nonmilitary locations.
Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific: Australia and New Zealand
This report on Australia and New Zealand is part of a project examining the perspectives of U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific as they formulate and implement their responses to China’s more assertive foreign and security policy and to a more competitive U.S.-China relationship. Australia and New Zealand have expanded their economic ties with China, but there is growing concern in both countries about China’s rising power and influence. In response, Australia is strengthening its alliance with the United States and becoming more actively involved in the Indo-Pacific region, especially in the Pacific Islands. New Zealand is also strengthening its security ties with the United States and intensifying its regional outreach (particularly, with its Pacific Island neighbors).
This stepped-up engagement in the region creates opportunities for the United States and, specifically, for the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Air Force to work with these two countries (and with other regional partners) in new and innovative ways, both operationally and using soft-power tools and approaches.
KEY FINDINGS
* Australia views its alliance with the United States as the cornerstone of its security policy and sees strengthening it as playing an indispensable role in ensuring its ability to navigate a regional security environment that is increasingly complicated by China’s more assertive behavior, including interference in Australian politics.
* At the same time, while China is a major economic partner for Australia, particularly with respect to trade, Australia aims to maintain a stable relationship with China even as it pushes back against Chinese influence and interference.
* There is growing concern in Australia that China’s rising power and influence undercuts Australia’s influence in the Indo-Pacific. Australia aims to gain back lost ground, particularly in the Pacific Islands, where it is stepping up its influence as it seeks to counter surging Chinese presence and become the partner of choice in the region.
* New Zealand has benefited from a growing economic relationship with China since signing a free trade agreement in 2007, but it faces challenges associated with China’s growing power and influence. New Zealand is also concerned about the durability of the regional and global order on which its security and prosperity depend.
* New Zealand has responded by strengthening its security ties with the United States since the 2010 Wellington Declaration. Additionally, New Zealand is increasing its regional outreach, most notably by intensifying its engagement with the Pacific Islands.
RECOMMENDATIONS
* Pacific Air Forces and the U.S. Air Force should develop options for expanding Enhanced Air Cooperation and consider conducting rotational deployments of U.S. Air Force bombers to northern Australia.
* Pacific Air Forces and the U.S. Air Force should invest in efforts to better understand Australia’s and New Zealand’s bilateral engagement program, particularly in training, exchanges, exercises, institutional capacity-building, and infrastructural investments and strengthen mechanisms to coordinate and deconflict, where appropriate.
* The Joint Force should further enhance U.S.-Australia and U.S.–New Zealand cooperation in space and strengthen U.S.-Australia cooperation in the areas of cyber and electronic warfare.
* The Joint Force should strengthen cooperation on research and development of advanced capabilities with Australia and explore options for the codevelopment of capabilities in which both countries are contributing financial resources and manpower.
* The U.S. government should continue to support Australia and New Zealand in taking a leading role in the Pacific (specifically, in Melanesia and Polynesia, respectively) and continue to encourage Australia’s growing cooperation and engagement with other U.S. allies, such as Japan and the Republic of Korea, and emerging partners, such as India and Indonesia.